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Reconciling Originalism with the Father of 
Conservatism: How Edmund Burke Answers the 
Disruption Dilemma in N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning 
 Recent scholarship argues that conservative and originalist 
jurisprudences contradict each other. In some cases, original, 
founding principles are invoked to overturn long-standing traditions. 
When that occurs, conservative values, such as respect for precedent, 
are challenged. The problem, as that scholarship points out, is that 
the same judges that espouse this disruptive originalism also claim 
to be conservative. As the polemic goes, good Burkean conservatives 
should reject originalism in favor of a precedent-based approach. 
This Comment challenges that scholarship by engaging in a more 
thorough analysis of Edmund Burke’s philosophy. After a deep 
examination of Burke’s thoughts on precedent and his doctrine of 
prescription, I argue that arguments pitting Burke against originalism 
go too far. Instead, Burke’s attitude toward “canonized forefathers” 
leaves room for an approach that simultaneously respects precedent 
while drawing upon founding wisdom. I offer an articulation of this 
approach, which I call Burkean Originalism, in this Comment. 
Essentially, Burke would resolve these difficulties by investigating 
both founding wisdom and the established tradition. With a 
presumption in favor of precedent, Burke would only invalidate 
longstanding tradition when doing so is consistent with founding 
principles, reliably determined, and if the consequences are not 
substantial. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret: originalist judges are usually also conservative. 
The list ranges from the late Judge Bork to current Associate Justices 
Thomas and Scalia, to name but a few. Yet, recent debate has 
unearthed a striking inconsistency over the union of these two 
philosophies. Professor David Strauss has made a persuasive case 
that conservatives ought to disavow themselves of originalism 
because it is a “destructive creed” that attacks “the existing order, 
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the existing tradition.”1 Instead, Professor Strauss contends that a 
return to “conventionalism” is more consistent with conservatism.2 
To be sure, a noticeable tension is present within the opinions of 
conservative originalists. On the one hand, a hallmark characteristic 
of conservative jurisprudence is a respect for precedent.3 Our society 
orders itself around the gradual development of constitutional law. 
Thus, a conservative approach emphasizes predictability in the 
administration of justice.4 Disrupting the existing order is more 
often the work of progressives. Originalists, on the other hand, seek 
to closely guard the founding ideals of our country by curing deviant 
precedent. Utilized as a sort of constitutional trump card, these 
judges often exhibit a preference for the framers’ understandings 
over established convention when discerning the constitutionality of 
statutes and practices. The result is often disruption, sacrificing 
century-long practices on the altar of original meaning. 
Professor Strauss’s argument notwithstanding, this same 
disruption dilemma is found in Burke’s thought as well, but is a 
nuance yet to be explored in the current scholarship. Such is this 
Comment’s aim. As Burke said in his most famous Reflections on the 
Revolution in France regarding the rash overthrow of the French 
government: 
A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper, and 
confined views. People will not look forward to their posterity, who never 
looked backward to their ancestors. Besides the people of England well 
know, that the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of 
conservation, and a sure principle of transmission; without at all 
excluding a principle of improvement.5 
To Burke, the success of government (and the prosperity of 
 
 1. David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 137, 144 (2011). 
 2. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
934–35 (1996). 
 3. Strauss, supra note 1, at 138. 
 4. In Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 515–16 (1996), Professor Thomas 
W. Merrill refers to Justice Scalia’s renowned article, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989), in which Scalia advances five “ideals” best served by a rule-based 
approach to law. Merrill maintains that these ideals can be closely analogized to those of 
conservatism. Merrill, supra, at 515–16. 
 5. EDMUND BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 4 WORKS AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 153, 177 (Francis Rivington & John 
Rivington eds., 1852) (emphasis added). 
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future generations) requires looking backward. His chief opponents 
were those who refused deference to the “collected reason of ages.”6 
While it may be said that conservatism and originalism clash, I argue 
that Burke, the father of conservatism and the face of the 
conservative charge against originalism, manifested this same inner-
conflict in his own thought. At the very least, an appeal to 
conservatives to reject originalism in Burke’s name goes too far. 
Burke’s writings never concede that this conflict is unworkable. 
On the contrary, he emphatically believed the surest path to true 
progress demands respect for both ancient wisdom and established 
convention. Therefore, my purpose is to outline a Burkean approach 
that synthesizes these tensions. Under this approach, which I term 
Burkean Originalism, judges determine where precedent and founding 
principles depart from one another. Then, with founding wisdom as 
their guide, judges consider the weight of the originalist evidence, 
the severity of the departure, and the strength of the established 
precedent. 
In Part II below, I describe the type of court case in which these 
tensions are most pronounced. In this most difficult case, reliable 
evidence of founding principles conflict with a very well established 
tradition. This Comment is most concerned with how originalist 
conservative judges rule when these two factors directly clash. In 
Part III, I delve into Burke’s writings to demonstrate that Burke 
would find this case difficult, a damaging notion to some scholars’ 
attempts to frame Burke as a pure traditionalist. Synthesizing 
Burke’s thought is challenging because, unlike many philosophers, 
he never wrote a treatise that states his philosophy and resolves 
contradictory thoughts. Instead, we are left with many volumes of 
books, speeches, notes, and letters that contain numerous 
inconsistencies and manifest some evolution in thought over time. 
As a result, I also look to the writings of several political scientists 
such as Francis Canavan, Russell Kirk, and Leo Strauss to mitigate 
this interpretive difficulty. These scholars are generally regarded as 
the authority on Burke’s writings. Ultimately, however, it is near 
impossible to authoritatively say exactly how Burke would approach 
questions of jurisprudence and originalism because the questions I 
address were simply not asked in his day. Section III, therefore, 
outlines the most likely interpretation of Burke’s thought, though 
 
 6. Id. at 228. 
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there may be some scholars who take issue with it. In Part IV, I 
outline my idea of Burkean Originalism, in which I apply the 
writings of Burke to the modern question of approaching 
constitutional questions with presumptions in favor of both 
originalism and conventionalism. This Comment aims to resolve the 
paradoxical world that originalist, conservative judges inhabit so that 
these judges can approach future cases involving this disruption 
dilemma, including the upcoming recess appointment case of 
N.L.R.B. v. Canning, without betraying their own ideologies. My idea 
of Burkean Originalism centers on the following canon: long-
standing traditions should be preserved unless evidence of a 
countervailing founding principle is reliable and the consequences of 
disrupting the tradition are not substantial. 
II. THE MOST DIFFICULT CASE 
In most cases, originalist and conservative values do not 
contradict. Some judicial inquiries involve inconclusive evidence of 
original meaning or weak and recent conventions. But imagine a case 
in which incontrovertible evidence of original meaning clearly 
contradicts a firmly established tradition. Here, a judge who 
simultaneously espouses originalist and conservative jurisprudences 
arguably faces a no-win scenario: respecting original meaning would 
disrupt a long-standing tradition, but respecting tradition would 
ignore original meaning. 
This tension reveals itself palpably in the warring opinions of 
Justices Thomas and Scalia in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.7 
Here, the Court invalidated a century-long practice prohibiting 
anonymous campaign literature. Following a majority opinion 
consisting of standard First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis, 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence and Justice Scalia’s dissent debate the 
sufficiency of originalist evidence in light of this long-standing 
tradition. 
Their ultimate disagreement was whether the originalist 
evidence in this case justified the disruption of an entrenched 
tradition. Justice Thomas highlighted instances where the founders 
 
 7. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). The majority opinion, which is not discussed in this Comment, 
resolves this question entirely on First Amendment, strict scrutiny analysis. Issues of the 
reliability of evidence regarding the original meaning of the First Amendment are tangential at 
best. 
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appeared to value anonymity, including the trial of John Peter Zenger 
and the publications of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers 
under pseudonyms.8 Even further, a Federalist versus Anti-
Federalist public debate developed over the value of anonymous 
speech and, ultimately, as Thomas points out, it appears that the 
Federalists accepted the Anti-Federalist position that it ought to be 
protected.9 To be sure, despite finding this evidence persuasive, 
Justice Thomas lamented the lack of an especially conclusive 
historical record.10 Additionally, he expressly acknowledges the 
paradox that I hope to address in this Comment: “While, like Justice 
Scalia, I am loath to overturn a century of practice shared by almost 
all of the States, I believe the historical evidence from the framing 
outweighs recent tradition.”11 
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, argued the opposite: the long-
standing tradition of anonymous electioneering, which had found its 
way into the laws of nearly every state, trumped the weak evidence 
that the founders sought to protect such speech.12 This case, he 
contends, is “the most difficult for determining the meaning of the 
Constitution.”13 His dissent highlights the conservative/originalist 
paradox by noting that originalism is not the only basis by which to 
make a decision: 
But there is other indication, of the most weighty sort: the 
widespread and longstanding traditions of our people. Principles of 
liberty fundamental enough to have been embodied within 
constitutional guarantees are not readily erased from the Nation’s 
consciousness. A governmental practice that has become general 
throughout the United States, and particularly one that has the 
validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presumption of 
 
 8. Id. at 360–61 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 9. Id. at 366. 
 10. Id. at 367 (“The historical record is not as complete or as full as I would desire.”). 
 11. Id. at 370. Elaborating, Justice Thomas said: 
When interpreting other provisions of the Constitution, this Court has believed itself 
bound by the text of the Constitution and by the intent of those who drafted and 
ratified it. It should hold itself to no less a standard when interpreting the Speech and 
Press Clauses. After reviewing the weight of the historical evidence, it seems that the 
Framers understood the First Amendment to protect an author’s right to express his 
thoughts on political candidates or issues in an anonymous fashion. 
 Id. at 370–71. 
 12. Id. at 378 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 375. 
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constitutionality.14 
Scalia viewed the originalist evidence in this case with serious 
skepticism. As such, he established a type of originalist canon for 
dealing with tradition: “Where the meaning of a constitutional text 
(such as ‘the freedom of speech’) is unclear, the widespread and 
long-accepted practices of the American people are the best 
indication of what fundamental beliefs it was intended to 
enshrine.”15 From this statement, it is not entirely clear how Scalia 
would answer this question if the originalist evidence were clearer. 
So, while Scalia frames this as “the most difficult” case, it appears 
there may yet be a more extreme case—i.e., a case in which the 
evidence of original meaning is clearer than in McIntyre. 
In fact, an extreme case of this ilk happens to be one of the most 
anticipated cases on the Supreme Court’s October 2013 docket: 
National Labor Relations Board v. Canning.16 In January 2013, the D.C. 
Circuit ruled that President Obama’s appointments to the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on January 4, 2012 were invalid.17 
Since three out of the five board members were invalidly appointed, 
the court vacated the NLRB’s decision against Noel Canning for lack 
of a quorum.  
The primary basis for the panel’s unanimous decision was an 
originalist reading of the “Recess Appointments Clause,” which the 
panel determined authorizes appointments only in intersession, as 
opposed to intrasession, recesses. Among the various sources of 
evidence, the panel cited Samuel Johnson’s English dictionary from 
1755, actions taken by the First Congress, the Federalist Papers, and 
 
 14. Id. at 375–77 (“And that is what we have before us here. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 3599.09(A) (1988) was enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio almost 80 years 
ago. See Act of May 27, 1915, 1915 Ohio Leg. Acts 350. Even at the time of its adoption, there 
was nothing unique or extraordinary about it. The earliest statute of this sort was adopted by 
Massachusetts in 1890, little more than 20 years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 
No less than 24 States had similar laws by the end of World War I, and today every State of the 
Union except California has one, as does the District of Columbia, and as does the Federal 
Government where advertising relating to candidates for federal office is concerned. Such a 
universal and long-established American legislative practice must be given precedence, I think, 
over historical and academic speculation regarding a restriction that assuredly does not go to the 
heart of free speech.”) (citations omitted). 
 15. Id. at 378. 
 16. 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 17. Id. at 493. 
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executive decisions from the decades following ratification.18 Taking 
the interpretations of the clause in the years immediately following 
ratification as most instructive of original meaning,19 the panel 
noted that executives had made only three documented intrasession 
recess appointments prior to 1947, the earliest being 80 years after 
ratification. The practice is relatively new. And the interpretations of 
those executives who followed this practice are so far removed from 
the original Framers that they have little bearing at all on the 
question of original meaning.20 In this way, the panel privileged 
what it saw as strong evidence of original meaning over a modern, 
now-well-established practice.  
The D.C. Circuit’s controversial decision marks the first time an 
executive’s exercise of this appointment power has been found 
unconstitutional. But it is not the first time a federal court of appeals 
has addressed the issue. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit reached the 
opposite conclusion in 2004 in Evans v. Stephens,21 when it 
determined that President Bush’s intrasession appointment of Judge 
Pryor to the same circuit did not violate the constitution. Unlike 
Canning, which invoked a heavy dose of originalism, the Evans court 
instead focused on the fact that such intrasession appointments are 
part of an established tradition.22 “Twelve Presidents have made 
more than 285 intrasession recess appointments of persons to offices 
that ordinarily require consent of the Senate.”23 
Pitted against each other in this way, Evans and Canning put 
originalist conservative judges in a tough position. The D.C. Circuit’s 
evidence of the original meaning of the “Recess Appointment 
Clause” is extensive and solid. On the other hand, the Eleventh 
Circuit correctly highlights that many presidents have frequently and 
persistently used this clause over the last century to make these 
allegedly unconstitutional appointments. To those jurists who 
simultaneously espouse both originalist and conservative 
inclinations, the debate in McIntyre or the conflict between Canning 
 
 18. Id. at 500–501. 
 19. Id. at 501 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008)). 
 20. Id. at 506 (“The dearth of intrasession appointments in the years and decades 
following the ratification of the Constitution speaks far more impressively than the history of 
recent presidential exercise of a supposed power to make such appointments.”). 
 21. 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 22. Id. at 1225–26. 
 23. Id. at 1226. 
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and Evans may appear to play out like a schizophrenic dialogue, an 
inner clash of competing values. This extreme case is a useful frame 
for imagining how a similarly conflicted Edmund Burke might 
navigate the collision between founding principles and established 
tradition. 
III. BURKEAN PRESCRIPTION 
Traditional invocations of Burke assume too much. Professor 
Strauss narrowly views Burke’s philosophy as merely a “theory of 
precedent.”24 However, I intend to show that Burke’s political 
thought is more nuanced, containing both a theory of precedent as 
well as a reverence for past or founding wisdom. In light of this 
nuance, Burke’s writings provide precedent for originalism since 
people cannot “look forward to posterity, who never looked 
backward to their ancestors.”25 Professor Strauss’s argument that 
conservatives should “reject originalism”26 because of Burke’s 
conservatism, therefore, goes too far. 
A. Burke’s Political Biography, Objectives, and Opponents 
1. An introduction to Burke’s political career and thought 
Born in 1729 in Dublin, Ireland,27 Edmund Burke spent most of 
his adult life as a politician.28 In 1765, Burke was elected to the 
British House of Commons, where he spent the next thirty years.29 
During that period, Burke influenced the major political discussions 
of his day through his speeches, pamphlets, and books.30 He never 
sought after higher positions of leadership, but he was never 
nominated for such positions either.31 Viewed as too heated and 
 
 24. David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 969, 973 (2008) (pointing to Burke as a counter to those who say that there is really no 
theory of precedent on which to support a precedent-based approach to constitutional 
interpretation). 
 25. BURKE, supra note 5, at 177. 
 26. Strauss, supra note 1, at 144; see also Strauss, supra note 24, at 973. 
 27. CONNOR CRUISE O’BRIEN, THE GREAT MELODY: A THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY OF EDMUND 
BURKE 3 (1992). 
 28. Harvey Mansfield, Edmund Burke, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 687 (Leo 
Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3rd ed. 1987). 
 29. Id. at 687; O’BRIEN supra note 27, at 404. 
 30. Mansfield, supra note 28, at 687. 
 31. Id. (noting that the highest office Burke achieved was that of Paymaster General, a 
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passionate, his rhetoric and style was met with distrust, even by 
those for whom he advocated most vociferously.32 
Consequently, Burke’s legacy consists of his political thought. 
But, as any student of Burke can attest, he never wrote a treatise of 
political philosophy.33 Instead, he abhorred the sort of abstract 
dialectic of philosophers,34 and considered himself “a practical 
politician rather than a philosopher.”35 To Burke, rational decision 
making required consideration of real circumstances rather than 
abstract propositions, a concept known as practical reason: 
“Circumstances are infinite, and infinitely combined; are variable and 
transient; he who does not take them into consideration, is not 
erroneous, but stark mad.”36 While Burke embraces practical reason, 
the coherency of his thought is necessarily limited by his decision 
not to write a treatise or a systematic and sustained exposition of his 
philosophy. Consequently, there is considerable debate among 
philosophers over the meaning of some of his writings—a limitation 
I openly concede here at the outset. 
Nonetheless, as a whole, Burke’s writings are “inherently 
conservative.”37 He argued endlessly against political radicalism,38 
 
“dignified secretarship lacking in glory”). 
 32. See id. at 687–88. William Pitt, First Earl of Chatham, remarked of Burke that he 
possessed “[m]uch to admire, and nothing to agree with.” In 1788, when Burke’s party faced the 
prospect of regaining power, Burke was omitted from a list of leading officeholders. 
 33. Id. at 688 (noting that nonetheless, “[h]is marvelous literary skills do not excuse us 
from taking him seriously, which requires taking his thought seriously as political philosophy” 
and that “Burke’s thought in a treatise would have lost the essence of his thought, and his style 
was suited to its substance”). 
 34. EDMUND BURKE, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, in 4 WORKS AND 
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 5 at 409 (“Nothing universal can be rationally affirmed on any 
moral, or any political subject. Pure metaphysical abstraction does not belong to these matters. 
The lines of morality are not like the ideal lines of mathematics. They are broad and deep as well 
as long. They admit of exceptions; they demand modifications. These exceptions and 
modifications are not made by the process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. Prudence is not 
only the first in rank of the virtues political and moral, but she is the director, the regulator, the 
standard of them all.”). 
 35. Ernest A. Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 645 (1994). 
 36. EDMUND BURKE, Speech on a Motion for Leave to Bring in a Bill to Repeal and Alter Certain 
Acts Respecting Religious Opinions, in 6 WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 5, at 101. 
 37. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2050 (2012)(book 
review). 
 38. See MICHAEL FREEMAN, EDMUND BURKE AND THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL RADICALISM 
(1980) (arguing that Edmund Burke proposed his own conservative theory of revolution and of 
political radicalism in opposition to the radical ideas of contemporary revolutionaries). 
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advocating instead that in order “[t]o avoid . . . the evils of 
inconstancy and versatility . . . no man should approach to look 
into [the state’s] defects or corruptions but with due caution.”39 He 
was the first critic of the French Revolution,40 which he saw as 
“liberty without wisdom, and without virtue”—“the greatest of all 
possible evils.”41 Rather, Burke advocated approaching political 
questions cautiously, with a “profound reverence for the wisdom of 
our ancestors”42 and with “reference to antiquity.”43 Though 
controversial at the time,44 this perspective has led to his 
contemporary label as the philosopher of “conservatism.”45 
2. Political opponents: The proponents of natural rights 
To properly understand Burke’s philosophy, it is essential to 
understand the primary theory he opposed, that governmental 
authority derived solely from the dispositions of the governed.46 In 
this section, I outline this theory as represented in the writings of his 
three primary opponents. As it happens, the conflict between Burke 
and his opponents was over who held the “title” to authority. 
Ultimately, by highlighting the theory of Burke’s opponents, which 
rejects outright any duty to draw on founding wisdom to interpret 
current constitutions, I intend to demonstrate that Burke’s 
conservatism opens the door for a Burkean Originalism. 
In Burke’s day, many political thinkers advocated a “natural 
rights” understanding of government legitimacy: the wills of the 
governed supplied the state’s authority, and when the state abused 
that authority, the people had the right to revoke it.47 Unlike Burke, 
 
 39. BURKE, supra note 5, at 229. 
 40. FREEMAN, supra note 38, at 4. 
 41. BURKE, supra note 5, at 353. 
 42. EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with America, in 3 
WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 5, at 269. 
 43. BURKE, supra note 5, at 176. 
 44. Carl T. Bogus, Rescuing Burke, MO. L. REV. 387, 452 (2007) (noting that Burke’s 
writings against the French Revolution were controversial, and often led to bitter disagreements 
and severed relationships). 
 45. Mansfield, supra note 28, at 688 (noting that Burke has been identified with the 
“traditionalism” school of thought in recent revivals of conservatism). 
 46. FRANCIS CANAVAN, EDMUND BURKE: PRESCRIPTION AND PROVIDENCE 114 (1987) 
[hereinafter EDMUND] (“To try to understand the Burkean doctrine of prescription in itself, 
without reference to the opposing doctrine, is to run the risk of missing its point.”). 
 47. FRANCIS CANAVAN, THE POLITICAL REASON OF EDMUND BURKE 104–05 (1960) 
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these thinkers contended that there could be only one “legitimate 
title to political authority: ‘the rights of men’”48 and that “a Nation 
has at all times an inherent, indefeasible right to abolish any form of 
Government it finds inconvenient.”49 As each individual has this 
right to judge for herself, current generations owe no duty to attend 
to “canonized forefathers.”50 This theory found its most prominent 
expression in the voices of Joseph Priestley, Richard Price, and 
Thomas Paine.51 
Joseph Priestley was arguably the most tame of Burke’s 
opponents, as he simultaneously advanced a “natural right” theory of 
government authority while dissociating himself from revolutionary 
extremism.52 Priestley saw government as the “great instrument 
of . . . progress of the human species.”53 Government’s claim to 
authority hinges on whether it advances or retards that progress,54 
and the governed are the judges of that. The people are only bound 
by maxims or policies that they themselves judge to be good.55 
Priestley justified this conception of government authority because 
of his understanding of the irrevocability of natural rights. Since man 
may not be deprived of his natural right to “reliev[e] himself from all 
oppression,” the conclusion that government’s authority is limited 
by the will of the people necessarily follows.56 Yet, he apparently lost 
confidence in this principle by remaining open to the notion that 
some natural rights may be surrendered so long as the power is 
distributed in a way “most conducive to the public welfare.”57 
  
 
[hereinafter POLITICAL REASON]. 
 48. CANAVAN, EDMUND, supra note 46, at 115. 
 49. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN: FOR THE BENEFIT AND USE OF ALL MANKIND 48 (1795) 
[hereinafter RIGHTS OF MAN: FOR THE BENEFIT]. 
 50. Id. at 43 (criticizing hereditary government as requiring “a belief from man to which 
reason cannot subscribe, and which can only be established upon his ignorance”). 
 51. CANAVAN, POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 106–13. 
 52. Id. at 107–08. 
 53. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 5 (1768). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 8 (“Their own reason and conscience are their only guide, and the people, in 
whose name they act, their only judge.”). 
 56. Id. at 12 (“[T]his must be the only true and proper foundation of all the governments 
subsisting in the world, and that to which the people who compose them have an unalienable 
right to bring them back.”). 
 57. CANAVAN, POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 108. 
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Going further than that, Richard Price argued that only 
representational forms of government can possess legitimate title to 
authority.58 Continuing Priestley’s line of argument, Price contended 
that “all civil government . . . is the creature of the people. It 
originates with them.”59 He criticized the British government as 
protecting liberty-in-name-only60 because the current representative 
system was undemocratic, and the elected representatives were 
neither subject to term limits nor to the instructions of their 
constituents.61 Two important principles emerge from Price’s work: 
first, “government is, or ought to be, nothing but an institution for 
collecting and for carrying into execution the will of the people”;62 
and second, as a result, “[c]ivil governors are properly the servants 
of the public.”63 These two principles considered, Price ultimately 
concluded that “representation in the legislature of a kingdom is the 
basis of constitutional liberty in it, and of all legitimate government; 
and that without it a government is nothing but an usurpation.”64 
This conclusion, set forth in his Discourse on the Love of Our Country, 
“aroused Burke’s wrath” and received significant attention in 
Reflections on the Revolution in France.65 
Finally, Thomas Paine, an important figure in American history, 
published his famous The Rights of Man as a riposte of Burke’s 
Reflections.66 Paine contended, as a starting point and much like 
Priestley and Price, that man is endowed with God-given rights at 
 
 58. Id. at 109–10. 
 59. RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY 6 (1776) [hereinafter 
OBSERVATIONS]. 
 60. CANAVAN, POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 109. 
 61. PRICE, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 59, at 9–11. 
 62. Id. at 87. 
 63. RICHARD PRICE, DISCOURSE ON THE LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY 23 (1789). 
 64. Id. at 39–40. 
 65. CANAVAN, POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 109; see also BURKE, supra note 34, at 
173 (“Dr. Price . . . proposes that his majesty should be told, on occasions of congratulation, 
that ‘he is to consider himself as more properly the servant than the sovereign of his people.”); 
id. at 204 (“Before I proceed further, I have to remark, that Dr. Price seems rather to overvalue 
the great acquisitions of light which he has obtained and diffused in this age.”); id. at 216 (“Why 
do I feel so differently from the Reverend Dr. Price, and those of his lay flock, who will choose to 
adopt the sentiments of his discourse?—For this plain reason—because it is natural I 
should . . . .”). 
 66. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN ANSWER TO MR. BURKE’S ATTACK ON THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION vii–viii (1791) (acknowledging that Paine had promised supporters of the 
French Revolution that he would answer Burke’s pamphlet upon publication). 
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creation.67 From this assumption, he drew even more radical 
conclusions than the other two thinkers.68 His ostensible purpose in 
responding to Burke was to lay out a theoretical justification for the 
French Revolution. To achieve this goal, Paine declared that “[a]ll 
hereditary government is in its nature unjust” because in such 
governments authority may only be inherited if the people can 
properly be treated as inheritable property—an offensive proposition 
to Paine.69 Thus, a monarchy, whose authority inheres in a 
particular genealogical line, cannot claim any legitimate title to 
authority, and the British government is therefore tyrannical by 
definition. 
In sum, Burke’s primary political opponents judged the 
legitimacy of government by present, individual concerns rather than 
tradition or collected wisdom. These popular sovereignty arguments 
by Priestley, Price, and Paine vindicated the political radicalism of 
the French Revolution because they taught that government is 
illegitimate when it fails to execute the will of the people. But Burke 
viewed this theory, that an unfulfilled general will justifies radical 
change, as capricious at best, but likely quite dangerous, since the 
conventional institutions of government have become deeply 
entrenched into every aspect of society over time. The point of 
conflict between Burke and his opponents was, therefore, not 
normative (i.e., what type of constitution is good), but technical: it 
was a question of title to political authority.70 Against the view that 
title derives from the national will, Burke offered an alternative basis 
known as “[p]rescription,” which holds that tradition and natural 
rights combine to form the “most solid of all titles.”71 To appreciate 
the doctrine of prescription, one must first understand Burke’s 
reverence for precedent. 
B. Burke and Precedent: The Beginnings of Conservatism 
As a starting point, Burke faced a dilemma. Philosophic and 
 
 67. CANAVAN, POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 111. 
 68. Id. 
 69. PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN: FOR THE BENEFIT, supra note 49, at 67. 
 70. CANAVAN, EDMUND, supra note 46, at 115. 
 71. EDMUND BURKE, Reform of the Representation of the Commons in Parliament, in 6 WORKS 
AND CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 5, at 130. 
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institutional evolution is both natural and desirable;72 yet, change 
can exact significant, retrogressive costs on society.73 Burke 
navigated this problem by advocating for gradual change and respect 
for precedent. This approach represents the inception and essence of 
philosophical conservatism.74 
Change is the most powerful law of nature.75 Thus, at its most 
basic level, change is a reality to be expected, not a possibility to be 
determined.76 Going further, not only is change natural, it is 
desirable as well, for “a state without the means of some change is 
without the means of its conservation.”77 Burke was well aware that 
traditional institutions may have defects,78 and his overall approach 
to tradition allows for the correction of these defects.79 
At the same time, permitting change risks opening Pandora’s 
box. Like Burke and Price, Paine also recognized that the traditional 
institutions were defective and allowed for their correction. As it 
happened, their prescribed method for curing these institutions was 
radical and revolutionary.80 Dramatic change of this nature troubled 
Burke because of its tendency to produce serious institutional and 
moral instability.81 
Burke’s answer to this predicament is that change should be 
permitted so long as it is gradual. To Burke, precedent is 
presumptively valid because it represents the “collected reason of 
ages.”82 History bestows wisdom on mankind from “the solid test of 
 
 72. EDMUND BURKE, A Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, Bart., M.P., On the Subject of the 
Roman Catholics of Ireland, and the Propriety of Admitting Them to the Elective Franchise, Consistently 
with the Principles of the Constitution as Established at the Revolution, in 4 WORKS AND 
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 5, at 544–45; see also BURKE, supra note 5, at 168 (arguing that 
institutional change is essential to the conservation of the state and its constitution). 
 73. BURKE, supra note 34, at 432. 
 74. Russell Kirk, Burke and the Philosophy of Prescription, 14 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 365, 365 
(1953) (stating that philosophic conservatism begins with Burke and that his doctrine of 
prescription comprises a defense of traditional society). 
 75. BURKE, supra note 72, at 544–45. 
 76. Id. at 544 (demonstrating, by Burke’s employ of the phrase “[a]ll we can do,” that 
nature acts on mankind regardless of obstinacy). 
 77. BURKE, supra note 5, at 168. 
 78. Id. at 229. 
 79. Id. at 168. 
 80. See generally PAINE, supra note 66. 
 81. BURKE, supra note 34, at 432. 
 82. BURKE, supra note 5, at 228. 
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long experience.”83 This collected wisdom, which he terms 
“prejudice” (a contemporaneous term devoid of its present-day 
pejorative meaning),84 accumulates in the species rather than the 
individual: “The individual is foolish . . . but the species is wise.”85 
For Burke, abandoning the collected wisdom of the ages, as Price and 
Paine seemed to suggest, is dangerous.86 Without it, men are left 
only with their “own private stock of reason.”87 But Burke suspects 
that this private stock in each man is small,88 and his conservatism 
asserts that meddling with institutions on the basis of such limited 
understanding is immoral.89 
Implicit in Burke’s presumption is the understanding that 
collected wisdom is not static but is augmented through the 
operation of time and experience. To contend otherwise is to deny 
the need for change, which is to deny nature.90 Precedent, therefore, 
must be understood to develop in tandem with societal wisdom. 
The question, then, is not whether change ought to occur, but 
rather by what degree. And the degree of change hinges, in large 
part, on how much society credits its own collected wisdom. 
Dramatic and rash change occurs when society rejects the collected 
wisdom. The rationalism of Priestley, Price, and Paine grants 
supreme deference to individual judgment,91 and positing that 
 
 83. Id. at 198. 
 84. Id. 
 85. BURKE, supra note 71, at 130; see also BURKE, supra note 5, at 198 (“They despise 
experience as the wisdom of unlettered men; and as for the rest, they have wrought 
underground a mine that will blow up, at one grand explosion, all examples of antiquity, all 
precedents, charters, and acts of parliament. They have ‘the rights of men.’”); id. at 222 (“Many 
of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to 
discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, and they seldom 
fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast 
away the coat of prejudice, and to leave nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice, with 
its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it 
permanence.”). 
 86. Kirk, supra note 74, at 377. 
 87. BURKE, supra note 5, at 222. 
 88. Id. 
 89. BURKE, supra note 34, at 426. 
 90. It is logical to suggest that recognition of a need for change occurs when the collected 
wisdom outgrows existing precedent. When this occurs precedent is readjusted to represent the 
now-updated collected wisdom. If precedent represents collected wisdom, and if collected 
wisdom were static, then precedent would never evolve because society would not apprehend 
any defects. 
 91. CANAVAN, POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 112. 
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submission to a dictated collected wisdom is the mark of 
ignorance.92 Gradual change through adherence to an ever-
developing set of precedent, on the other hand, venerates the 
collected wisdom and provides the benefits of natural evolution 
without creating dangerous inconstancy.93 In Burke’s words, change 
that proceeds by “insensible degrees” prevents the “unfixing [of] old 
interests at once.”94 
Burke’s gradualism settles the “change” dilemma as far as it is 
presently framed.95 However, this dilemma is further complicated by 
the arguments of his political opponents who essentially ask: is not a 
debate over how fast to change defective institutions premature if 
those institutions are illegitimate in the first place? To them, the 
question of whether a government has legitimate title to govern is 
one that looms large over the heads of each generation. And, of 
course, Burke’s doctrine of prescription mitigates this concern by re-
framing precedential legitimacy in terms of age and effects. As I 
intend to show, Burke carves out space, in the course of defending 
prescription, for harmony between originalism and conservatism. 
C. Prescription: The Most Solid of All Titles 
Professor Strauss’s contention that conservatives should reject 
originalism would perhaps prove decisive if Burke were a pure 
traditionalist.96 As the argument would go, Burke values a 
 
 92. PAINE, supra note 66, at 42. 
 93. BURKE, supra note 72, at 544–45 (“This mode will, on the one hand, prevent the 
unfixing old interests at once: a thing which is apt to breed a black and sullen discontent in those 
who are at once dispossessed of all their influence and consideration. This gradual course, on the 
other side, will prevent men long under depression, from being intoxicated with a large draught 
of new power, which they always abuse with licentious insolence.”). 
 94. Id.; see also BURKE, supra note 5, at 168 (arguing that, when remedying defective 
institutions, the change should be confined to the offending part only and must not destroy “the 
whole civil and political mass”). 
 95. See id. at 178 (“By a constitutional policy working after the pattern of nature, we 
receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges, in the same manner in which 
we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives. The institutions of policy, the goods of 
fortune, the gifts of Providence, are handed down to us, and from us, in the same course and 
order. Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of 
the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory 
parts; wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great 
mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-
aged, or young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied 
tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression.”). 
 96. Strauss, supra note 1, at 144 (arguing that a preference for adhering to precedent cuts 
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somewhat dogmatic adherence to precedent, so trifling with original 
principles is needless and often disruptive. However, Burke’s 
commitment to precedent is not absolute as his theory of 
prescription demonstrates. Prescription is arguably his most 
influential, controversial, and opaque contribution to political 
theory.97 In this section, after defining this doctrine generally, I 
intend to demonstrate three principles: (1) Burke’s answer to the 
question of title conflates tradition and natural rights, whereas his 
opponents focus only on the latter; (2) by refusing to deny the 
existence of natural rights, his conservative theory of traditionalism 
is opposed to simply following precedent for precedent’s sake—a 
common misconception evident in passing references to Burkean 
conservatism; and (3) a close look at his writings exposes a tension 
between his embrace of gradual progression and his reverence for 
ancient wisdom, which tension lends itself to multiple 
interpretations regarding Burke’s historicism. These three principles 
create breathing space for originalism in Burke’s philosophy. 
Borrowing from Roman property law,98 Burke’s prescription 
theory extends the principle of adverse possession of property—
whereby title to land may be gained through a long, uninterrupted, 
and uncontested period of possession—to government authority.99 
Title to political authority derives from a series of unimpeached 
conventions spanning many generations.100 According to Burke, a 
“mysterious veil” is draped over the origins of government,101 
 
against originalism); see also Strauss, supra note 24, at 973 (pointing to Burke as an expression of 
a conservative theory of precedent). 
 97. See Russell Kirk, Burke, Providence, and Archaism, 69 SEWANEE REV. 179, 180–81 (1961) 
(noting the significant controversy over Burke’s prescription principle, which was hotly debated 
by Dr. Leo Strauss and other critics of Burke). 
 98. Mansfield, supra note 28, at 702. 
 99. Paul Lucas, On Edmund Burke’s Doctrine of Prescription; Or, an Appeal from the New to the 
Old Lawyers, 11 HIST. J. 35, 36 (1968). 
 100. Kirk, supra note 74, at 378. Given the historical context and the popularity of the 
ideas of Price and Paine, Burke’s pronouncement of this theory was quite controversial, and 
perhaps only appeared legitimate because of his status and reputation. As Kirk noted: 
Courage was required for such declarations in support of prejudice; in a lesser man, 
this stand would have been dismissed with scorn by the literate public. Burke, 
however, they could not scorn. It is some indication of the strength of Burke’s belief 
in Christian humility that he, with his acute and far-ranging mind, could be the 
partisan of the instincts of the race against the assumptions of the man of genius. 
Id. 
 101. EDMUND BURKE, Speeches in the Impeachment of Warren Hastings, in 7 WORKS AND 
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 5, at 324. Here, Burke’s contention that title is unconcerned with 
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meaning that whether authority was wrongfully obtained is irrelevant 
to whether current authority is rightfully possessed, so long as 
prescription has run its course.102 His theory of prescription, 
therefore, amplifies his theory of precedent while his opponents 
remain endlessly skeptical of dictated tradition.103 For Burke, there 
is a presumption in favor of any “settled scheme” over some “untried 
project.”104 
This presumption, however, is rebuttable. Burke admitted that 
even old institutions were not per se legitimate; instead, insofar as 
they produce intolerable grievances impervious to reformation or 
restraint, they are ripe for change.105 Concerning old institutions, 
there is certainly a thumb on the scale in favor of their legitimacy. 
The British Constitution’s sole claim to authority, for example, is 
found in prescription.106 But prescription is merely the “most solid” 
of titles; it is not automatically solid. Instead, prescription is 
grounded in natural law, which affixes the limits and determines the 
ends of government; it supplies government’s “bearings and its 
 
the origins of possession differs from more ancient understandings, in which title to property 
may be obtained only when the adverse possessor actually believes she rightfully possesses the 
land. Lucas, supra note 99, at 40. 
 102. See POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 121 (“That they were illegitimate in their 
beginnings does not mean that they are illegitimate now.”); Francis Canavan, Burke on 
Prescription of Government, 35 REV. POL. 454, 468–69 (1973) [hereinafter Burke on Prescription] 
(stating that prescription eliminates concern for original legitimacy and focuses the inquiry 
instead on the existing constitution). It is important to be clear about what Burke does and does 
not mean. Consideration of original legitimacy is irrelevant when prescription has occurred 
(since adverse possession does not grant title to the possessor until sufficient time has passed). 
However, until title is gained, the presumptive legitimacy of authority is still open for discussion 
for Burke. See FREEMAN, supra note 38, at 102 (demonstrating that the French Revolution was 
not yet settled and the violation of established tradition was so great that Burke felt his attack 
was not inconsistent). 
 103. RIGHTS OF MAN: FOR THE BENEFIT, supra note 49, at 42 (“[I]gnorance submits to 
whatever is dictated to it.” This statement typifies Paine’s suspicion of hereditary wisdom and 
authority.). 
 104. BURKE, supra note 71, at 130. 
 105. EDMUND BURKE, Speech on a Motion Made in the House of Commons by the Right Hon. C. J. 
Fox, May 11, 1792, For Leave to Bring in a Bill to Repeal and Alter Certain Acts Respecting Religious 
Opinions, Upon the Occasion of a Petition of the Unitarian Society, in 6 WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE, 
supra note 5, at 106 (“We must assume the rights of what represents the public to control the 
individual, to make his will and his acts to submit it to their will, until some intolerable 
grievance shall make us know that it does not answer its end, and will submit neither to 
reformation nor restraint.”). 
 106. FREEMAN, supra note 38, at 95. 
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ensigns.”107 Consequently, Burke’s theory of prescription must not 
be understood as a rigid commitment to the status quo. Rather, by 
recognizing that elapsed time is a means to gain title, each new 
generation need not “constantly discuss” the origins of government 
with skepticism.108 That the institutions exist is proof enough of 
their presumptive legitimacy. What is left to be determined is 
whether, in the course of history, the institutions develop, or fail to 
develop, in accordance with collected wisdom and within the bounds 
of natural law. 
Prescription, therefore, solves Burke’s dilemma. At one level, his 
gradualism safely navigates the tension between change and 
precedent addressed in the preceding section. Then, his prescription 
theory of title, founded in respect for precedent and ancient wisdom, 
reduces the prospects of revolution because the people can discuss 
the efficacy of institutions without constantly resorting to a debate 
over whether authority was rightfully obtained. It was Burke’s object 
to demonstrate that political authority was not dependent on the 
flippant, fickle will of a majority of the people at any given time.109 
According to him, theories of title that emphasize popular 
sovereignty “tend . . . to the utter subversion, not only of all 
government, in all modes, and of all stable securities to rational 
freedom, but of all the rules and principles of morality itself.”110 
Thus, political radicalism not only undermined its own, often 
laudable, goals, but also inflicted costly damage to the natural 
progression of mankind. To Burke, prescription represented a more 
reasonable model for accommodating progression while minimizing 
instability. 
1. Prescription combines both tradition and natural rights 
Despite his fierce rejection of Priestley, Price, and Paine, who 
each advance increasingly radical arguments that title to authority 
derives only from the natural rights of the people, Burke never 
 
 107. BURKE, supra note 5, at 178. 
 108. BURKE, supra note 36, at 106. 
 109. POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 127. 
 110. BURKE, supra note 5, at 432; see also id. at 202 (“Finding their schemes of politics not 
adapted to the state of the world in which they live, they often come to think lightly of all public 
principle; and are ready, on their part, to abandon for a very trivial interest what they find of very 
trivial value.”). 
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rejected the existence or utility of natural rights.111 Instead, the 
point of disagreement lay in the role that natural rights ought to play 
in determining title, and, for Burke, prescription has priority over 
natural rights on this question.112 
Burke’s refusal to deny the existence of natural rights, even when 
doing so would clarify and strengthen his theory, reveals his firm 
commitment to both tradition and natural rights.113 Tradition, the 
modus operandi of gradual progress, is restrained by natural rights 
in that tradition should not evolve towards a suppression of these 
rights. This combination unearths a tension in his thought and 
opens his theory up to some vulnerability.114 As one scholar asked, 
“[h]ow is a moral order characterized by permanence related to this 
temporal scene of constant change?”115 
While I do not intend to entirely resolve this question on Burke’s 
behalf,116 I draw attention to it because originalist-conservatives 
operate under a similar tension. Their conservatism pushes them 
toward a precedent-based jurisprudence, and the development of 
those precedents is restrained by founding principles. To be sure, the 
analogy between natural rights and founding principles is imperfect. 
However, to originalists, founding principles set constitutional limits 
and determine institutional ends just as Burke’s natural rights serve 
as “bearings” and “ensigns” to prescription. 
2. Following precedent for precedent’s sake is not Burkean 
The need and inevitability of change, the accumulation of 
 
 111. BURKE, supra note 5, at 198 (“Far am I from denying in theory; full as far is my heart 
from withholding in practice (if I were of power to give or to withhold) the real rights of men. In 
denying their false claims of right, I do not wish to injure those which are real, and are such as 
their pretended rights would totally destroy.”). But cf. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND 
HISTORY 318 (“Burke comes close to suggesting that to oppose thoroughly evil current in human 
affairs is perverse if that current is sufficiently powerful.”). Professor Leo Strauss, and some 
subsequent critics, read in Burke a firm commitment to whatever happens in history, which 
would suggest that Burke denied a place for natural rights in his philosophy. However, there is a 
strong argument that this criticism is unjust. Kirk, supra note 97, at 181. 
 112. FREEMAN, supra note 38, at 94. 
 113. POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 115–16 (stating that it would have been easier for 
him to simply deny that man, in civil society, enjoyed natural rights). 
 114. Id. at 100 (outlining the contradiction between Burke’s belief in progress and his 
nostalgia for the past). 
 115. Rodney W. Kilcup, Burke’s Historicism, 49 J. MODERN HIST. 394, 394 (1977). 
 116. However, Burke’s belief in progress by precedent is not formally incompatible with 
his belief in natural rights. See FREEMAN, supra note 38, at 100. 
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collected wisdom, and the restraint that natural rights place on 
tradition all combine to suggest that precedent is not always right. In 
Burke’s words, “Precedents merely as such cannot make Law—
because then the very frequency of Crimes would become an 
argument of innocence.”117 Prescription does not entirely settle the 
question of title; it just gives it a starting place. 
While there is a “sacred veil” draped over a precedent’s origins, 
which veil should remove any debate over the precedent’s original 
legitimacy, institutions must still fulfill their inherent, natural ends. 
Prescription therefore focuses the question of institutional 
legitimacy on its fulfillment of natural purposes rather than on 
whether the institution was originally unjust or tyrannical. And the 
passage of time alone will not justify a government that frustrates 
these ends.118 
To be sure, Burke felt an institution’s legitimacy is determined 
by looking to its effects: “Old establishments are tried by their 
effects. If the people are happy, united, wealthy, and powerful, we 
presume the rest. We conclude that to be good from whence good is 
derived.”119 However, this statement must be interpreted with 
caution. Burke offers little guidance for judging the effects of these 
old establishments, and he abhors revolutionaries like Price and 
Paine who are audacious enough to judge and change constitutions 
“at pleasure.”120 In fact, Burke labors to challenge strictly 
traditionalist arguments that claim a custom is necessarily good 
merely because a nation has flourished under it.121 
Consequently, Burke rejects dogmatic adherence to precedent yet 
warns us against rashly judging institutions. This principle calls into 
question many contemporary, often passing, invocations of Burke’s 
thought. For one, Professor Strauss neglects this nuance 
altogether.122 Associating him with “traditionalism”123 and 
 
 117. POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 122–23 (quoting from Burke’s notes for a 
speech). 
 118. EDMUND, supra note 46, at 127. 
 119. BURKE, supra note 5, at 292. 
 120. BURKE, supra note 34, at 472. 
 121. HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE, 1 THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND 419 (Parker et al. 
eds., 1861). But cf. Kirk, supra note 74, at 374–75 (arguing that Buckle translates Burke’s 
exceptions for the rule). 
 122. See generally Strauss, supra note 2. 
 123. Id. at 892–93. 
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“incrementalism,”124 Strauss tends to convey that a good Burkean 
conservative is entirely beholden to precedent. He acknowledges that 
there may be Burkean grounds for respecting the founders’ intent, 
but he quickly dismisses the current-originalist approach by labeling 
framers’ explanations of their rationales as “the product of less 
careful consideration, and may even be post hoc rationalization, self-
justification, and political posturing.”125 This approach fails to take 
seriously Burke’s clear disavowal of “precedents merely as such,” his 
pride in British reforms that had hitherto proceeded “with reference 
to antiquity,” and his hope that future reforms will be so “carefully 
formed.”126 
Even Professor Steven Calabresi, a defender of originalism, 
assumes, as his starting point, that Burke’s thought leaves no room 
for originalism.127 Pointing to ten of the most important overrulings 
of the twentieth century, he demonstrates how Supreme Court 
decisions manifest an actual commitment to the text of the 
Constitution (as originally understood) rather than a hesitancy to 
overturn precedent. Drawing a sharp contrast with Strauss and 
others who have invoked Burkean traditionalism, he concludes: 
If we are going to be good Burkeans and follow tradition, we must 
admit that the United States has a tradition of allowing the Court 
occasionally to upset the apple cart by appealing to the 
Constitution’s text or first principles. . . . [A] good Burkean living 
in the American constitutional culture should admit that it is not 
our practice to follow precedent on any constitutional matter of any 
significance. Burkean Americans then should be textualists and 
should follow the document, not the doctrine.128 
While Professor Calabresi’s point lends supports to my argument 
that Burke would be opposed to dogmatic precedent adherence, his 
contention fails to consider that even Burke himself allowed for 
occasionally upsetting “the apple cart.” 
Professor Thomas Merrill pits Burke against originalism in his 
piece Bork v. Burke.129 Here, again, Burke is seen entirely as a 
 
 124. Id. at 930. 
 125. Id. at 899–900. 
 126. BURKE, supra note 5, at 176. 
 127. Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 
57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 636–37 (2006). 
 128. Id. at 686–87. 
 129. Supra note 4. 
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traditionalist, also referred to as a “conventionalist” in much of the 
literature. To be sure, Professor Merrill uses Burke’s thought to 
create a persuasive defense of conventionalism against originalism, 
stating that Burke was skeptical of the French revolutionaries 
because “they had a false and inflated notion of the power of human 
reason to rearrange society in accordance with abstract rational 
principles.”130 Yet, without more consideration of Burke’s writings, 
even this line of reasoning can be construed to leave plenty of room 
for originalism. 
Finally, in perhaps the most thorough analysis of Burke’s 
thought, Professor Ernest Young advocates that conservative judges 
ought to adopt a more “conservative” jurisprudence.131 To Professor 
Young, reliance on originalism, judicial restraint, and bright-line 
rules have threatened “the good name of ‘conservatism.’”132 In fact, 
he uses Burke’s conservatism as a sword to critique originalists, and 
the persuasiveness of Young’s polemic is diminished by his agenda. 
Professor Young lifts five major principles from Burke’s philosophy: 
(1) human reason and the rejection of abstract theory, (2) tradition 
and prescriptive wisdom, (3) the organic social contract, (4) the 
possibility of evolutionary change, and (5) the natural aristocracy.133 
More so than the other authors, he certainly acknowledges that 
precedent develops cautiously. Yet, this focus ignores and distracts 
from Burke’s recognition that there is significant value in founding 
wisdom and looking backward toward our ancestors. 
3. Tension in Burke’s emphasis of both gradual progression and ancient 
wisdom 
The polemic against conservative originalist attempts to attack a 
“contradiction” between the “competing” judicial values. However, 
Burke himself manifests a similar inner conflict. Therefore, to say 
originalist conservatives are not Burkean misses the mark. 
In An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, Burke defines the 
British Constitution as the product of “many minds, in many 
ages.”134 He thus urged: 
 
 130. Id. at 519–20. 
 131. See generally Young, supra note 35. 
 132. Id. at 724. 
 133. Id. at 642–59. 
 134. BURKE, supra note 34, at 487. 
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Let us follow our ancestors, men not without a rationale, though 
without an exclusive confidence in themselves; who, by respecting 
the reason of others, who, by looking backward as well as forward, 
by the modesty as well as by the energy of their minds, went on, 
insensibly drawing this constitution nearer and nearer to its 
perfection by never departing from its fundamental principles, nor 
introducing any amendment which had not a subsisting root in the 
laws, constitution, and usages of the kingdom.135 
The proper development of institutions demands continuity with 
the past, which instills order and ensures conservation.136 Change, 
though necessary, must be gradual, “insensibly drawing [the] 
constitution nearer and nearer to its perfection by never departing 
from its fundamental principles.”137 Indeed, as Professor Russell 
Kirk so ably put it, Burke envisioned that “[o]ur part is to patch and 
polish the old order of things, clothing ancient form with new 
substance, fitting recent experience and need into the pattern of the 
wisdom of our ancestors.”138 
On the other hand, other students of Burke have advised caution 
when interpreting Burke’s relationship with his British ancestors.139 
 
 135. Id. at 489. 
 136. Burke on Prescription, supra note 102, at 470 (“For it is continuity with the past that 
makes the constitution a predisposed order of things to which men are born and which has an 
antecedent claim on their obedience and consent.”). 
 137. BURKE, supra note 34 at 489; for additional statements by Burke along this vein see 
also BURKE, supra note 5, at 177 (“You will observe, that from Magna Charta to the Declaration 
of Right, it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties as an 
entailed inheritance derived from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity.”); id. (“A 
spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper, and confined views. People will 
not look forward to posterity, who never looked backward to their ancestors. Besides, the people 
of England well know, that the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation, and 
a sure principle of transmission; without at all excluding a principle of improvement.”); id. at 
178 (“We procure reverence to our civil institutions on the principle upon which nature teaches 
us to revere individual men; on account of their age, and on account of those from whom they 
are descended.”); GRAHAM WALLAS, HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS 182–83 (4th ed., 1948) (“Burke 
was sincerely convinced that men’s power of political reasoning was so utterly inadequate to 
their task that all his life long he urged the English nation to follow prescription, to obey, that is 
to say, on principle their habitual political impulses. But the deliberate following of prescription 
which Burke advocated was something different, because it was the result of choice, from the 
uncalculated loyalty of the past. Those who have eaten of the tree of knowledge cannot forget.”). 
 138. Kirk, supra note 74, at 379. Kirk stated further, “[w]e must try to distinguish between 
a profound, slow, natural alteration and some infatuation of the hour. Here again the instrument 
of expedience is required for the wise reconciliation of prescription with necessary alteration.” 
 139. See, e.g., FREEMAN, supra note 38, at 97 (labeling such passages as “rhetorical 
exaggeration” and stating that they “are not to be taken literally”); Mansfield, supra note 28, at 
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At times, he spoke condescendingly toward Britain’s ancient 
founders, prompting one scholar to say that Burke “praises the 
British constitution to the skies, but never its founders.”140 
These statements by Burke have led to a considerable number of 
interpretations, with some finding a place for founding principles in 
judging established institutions where others do not. This 
disagreement in the scholarship demonstrates why the assumptions 
by Professors Strauss, Merrill, and Young that Burke’s philosophy 
leaves no room for originalism go too far. 
IV. BURKEAN ORIGINALISM 
Part II defined the dilemma that this Comment seeks to resolve: 
How will a conservative originalist decide a controversy involving a 
long-standing tradition that conflicts with strong originalist 
evidence? In Part III, I suggested that, despite attempts by some to 
pit Edmund Burke against originalism, the father of conservatism 
manifested the same inner conflict as these conservative originalists. 
Now, I attempt to show how Burke may approach this dilemma. I 
argue that Burke would synthesize the pure originalist and strict 
traditionalist approaches, engaging in, what I term, Burkean 
Originalism. 
A. Burkean Originalism Defined 
In order to articulate my idea of Burkean Originalism, we must 
first understand his preference for practical reason over abstract 
theory.141 To Burke, principles and theories should be applied only 
after consideration of actual circumstances and potential 
consequences.142 Accordingly, any approach bearing his name must 
 
703 (“Prescription takes its bearing from current use, unless property or government has been 
recently usurped. It is opposed to historical claims that would overthrow established power, and 
it is skeptical of historical research that would confirm it.”). 
 140. Mansfield, supra note 28, at 697. Going further, Mansfield wrote, “[t]he dead are not 
founders; they are silent partners who have had their say and now make their points by 
unspoken reproach.” Id. 
 141. It is on this point that many (most notably Leo Strauss) have refused Burke the title 
of “philosopher.” Dating back to Aristotle, philosophers have continually concerned themselves 
with abstract, immutable principles rather than the practical life. Instead, Burke is often referred 
to as a “philosophically informed statesman.” Gary D. Glenn, Burke, in AN INVITATION TO 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 353–54 (Kenneth L. Deutsch & Joseph R. Fornieri eds., 2009). 
 142. EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Presenting to the House of Commons, a Plan for the Better Security 
of the Independence of Parliament, and the Economical Reformation of the Civil and Other Establishments, 
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be characterized by a concern for particulars. Burke aptly 
characterized his own methodology: “I must see with my own eyes, I 
must, in a manner, touch with my own hands, not only the fixed, but 
the momentary circumstances, before I could venture to suggest any 
political project whatsoever. . . . I must see all the aids, and all the 
obstacles.”143 Indeed, a major element of his criticism of the French 
Revolution rests on his allegation that the French failed to situate 
theoretical truth within practical reality.144 His firm commitment to 
the practical over the theoretical even bled into his faith, where he 
readily recognized that Christianity’s theological (and thus abstract) 
claims were less certain than man’s right to the enjoyment of 
society.145 In sum, to understand his approach to difficult questions, 
we must see him as a politician rather than a thinker; law is a messy 
endeavor and requires him to get his hands dirty. Unlike clean, 
abstract reasoning, Burke wades deep into the thick, muddy reality. 
In light of his distaste for abstraction, Burke would resolve this 
“founding wisdom versus established tradition” dilemma by 
unearthing the pertinent particulars. I argue that Burke would ask 
three questions: (1) What founding principles can we reliably 
discern? (2) How and why did we depart from those principles? and 
(3) What are the practical consequences of disrupting the tradition 
that has grown from the departure? Armed with these questions, 
Burkean Originalism prescribes the following canon: long-standing 
traditions should be preserved unless evidence of a countervailing 
founding principle is reliable and the consequences of disrupting the 
tradition are not substantial. 
This canon favoring longstanding traditions follows naturally 
from Burke’s theory of prescription. Established precedents are the 
product of the collected reason of ages and are thereby presumed 
valid by virtue of their endurance.146 Yet, as Burke’s prescription 
 
in 3 WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 5, at 401 (“Those things, which are not 
practicable, are not desirable.”). 
 143. EDMUND BURKE, Letter to a Member of the National Assembly, in 4 WORKS AND 
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 5, at 384. 
 144. Id. at 386 (“What a number of faults have led to this multitude of misfortunes, and 
almost all from this one source—that of considering certain general maxims without attending 
to circumstances, to times, to places, to conjunctures and to actors!”). 
 145. EDMUND BURKE, Tracts Relative to the Laws Against Popery in Ireland, in 6 WORKS AND 
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 5. 
 146. See supra Part III.C (stating that the age of institutions is a rebuttable presumption 
that favors their validity). 
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theory admits, this presumption is rebuttable: a precedent’s ultimate 
validity hangs on its effects, and those effects are judged with 
reference to, among other things, founding principles. Consider how 
Burke’s approach contrasts with Justice Scalia’s. In McIntyre, he 
proposed the following canon: “Where the meaning of a 
constitutional text . . . is unclear, the widespread and long-
accepted practices of the American people are the best indication of 
what fundamental beliefs it was intended to enshrine.”147 Justice 
Scalia’s approach is hierarchical: clear, original meaning trumps 
established tradition, which trumps unclear original meaning. The 
Burkean Originalism I propose here eschews hierarchy and instead 
weighs the evidence of meaning and practice simultaneously. 
Of course, the difficulties of “doing history” raise concerns about 
the reliability of any determination of original meaning. Due to the 
robust trove of founding-era documents, any judge that attempts to 
draw originalist conclusions is susceptible to playing “fast and loose 
with history,” especially since judges are not professional 
historians.148 Consequently, many scholars question the value of 
such an exercise. Burke is no exception. His proclivity for gradual 
change and prescriptive authority makes him skeptical of historical 
arguments against established tradition,149 so founding principles 
will influence his judgment only if they are reliably established. For 
example, Burke would be skeptical any time opposite and equally 
plausible arguments can be made from original evidence, such as in 
cases like Dred Scott v. Sanford,150 Lee v. Weisman,151 and District of 
Columbia v. Heller.152 But there are plenty of founding principles that 
can be reliably discerned.153  Without outlining a theory of 
 
 147. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 378 (1995). 
 148. Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 639 (2008). To be sure, Cornell does admit that we should not 
expect professional quality history in judicial opinions, but we also should not let them get away 
with bad history. Id. 
 149. Mansfield, supra note 28, at 702. 
 150. 60 U.S. 397 (1857) (involving majority and dissenting opinions that drew opposite 
conclusions over the founders intent regarding the citizenship status of African Americans). 
 151. 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (involving majority and dissenting opinions that drew opposite 
conclusions over what the original meaning of the establishment clause says about school 
prayer). 
 152. 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (involving majority and dissenting opinions that drew different 
conclusions about the original meaning of the Second Amendment as pertaining to gun control 
legislation). 
 153. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Canning, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Crawford v. Washington, 
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reliability, it is consistent with Burkean thought to suggest that a 
historical conclusion is reliable if, after honest inspection, the weight 
of the evidence convincingly confirms it. 
Burke’s second question, concerning the point of departure, is 
especially relevant because a precedent’s prescriptive authority 
depends on the duration of its existence. Again, his prescription 
theory derives from the principle of adverse possession, which 
appreciates how the passage of time influences societal expectations 
of property use.154 For example, Burke opposed the French 
Revolution even after its completion because not enough time had 
elapsed for new traditions to become firmly established.155 Thus, 
locating the point of departure provides perspective on the 
legitimacy of a precedent’s “title” to authority. 
Presumably, there is a direct relationship between the duration 
of a precedent’s existence and the consequences that would result 
from disrupting it, which is Burke’s third question. The older the 
precedent, the more likely society has ordered itself around that 
precedent, and any change could have far-reaching consequences. 
Burke’s emphasis on gradual change grew out of his dread of 
institutional and moral instability that so often lurked in the 
penumbra of progressive reform.156 He readily conceded that a 
legitimate constitution must provide means for its own amendment, 
but rash disruption betrays the collected wisdom and inflicts 
retrogressive costs on society.157 Consequently, predicting the 
results that would follow from disrupting a precedent is Burke’s 
final, and most important, endeavor. 
To be sure, applying practical reason to investigations into the 
reliability of founding principles and the dangers of overturning 
precedent can lead different Burkeans to different conclusions. The 
three questions seek conclusions that, at least to an extent, require 
some subjectivity. But that type of subjective, fact-intensive decision 
making is inherently Burkean, and it is not entirely different from 
other jurisprudential approaches. For example, textualists frequently 
 
541 U.S. 36 (2004); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 335 (1995) (demonstrating 
that even if original evidence does not establish a constitutional right, it may still convey a 
founding principle). 
 154. See supra Part III.C. 
 155. FREEMAN, supra note 38, at 102. 
 156. BURKE, supra note 34, at 432. 
 157. Id. 
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employ the same tools of statutory construction and draw distinct 
conclusions.158 Hundreds of years of tort cases demonstrate that the 
“reasonable person” test often involves a balancing of normative 
interests, which can often lead reasonable judges to equally 
reasonable but different opinions.159 
Ultimately, Burkean Originalism is a method of judicial 
reasoning, and its utility is grounded in its preference for precedent-
respectful outcomes after thoughtful consideration of founding 
wisdom. Just as many jurists are pulled in different directions by 
opposing conservative and originalist inclinations, Edmund Burke 
exhibited this same personal tug-of-war, and, despite what Professor 
Strauss argues, this tension is workable and advantageous. 
B. Burkean Originalism: Three Applications to Prior Decisions 
Ironically, my abstract articulation of Burke’s jurisprudence very 
nearly betrays his distrust of theory. Thus, in the following sections, 
I apply Burkean Originalism to three Supreme Court opinions: 
Crawford v. Washington,160 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,161 and 
Apprendi v. New Jersey.162 By drawing on these cases, I intend to show 
how Burkean Originalism can influence judicial outcomes. 
1. Crawford v. Washington: an opinion worthy of Burke 
Crawford relied on founding principles to halt a judicial tradition 
of admitting testimonial hearsay evidence that is never subject to 
cross-examination.163 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment ensures that the accused has the right to be “confronted 
with the witnesses against him.”164 However, in its 1980 decision in 
Ohio v. Roberts,165 the Court decided that out-of-court testimony by 
witnesses unavailable for cross-examination is permissible so long as 
the testimony bears “adequate indicia of reliability.” In a 7-2 
 
 158. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (showing that Justices O’Connor 
and Scalia arrive at different interpretations of the phrase “use a firearm”). 
 159. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 560 n.82 
(1972). 
 160. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 161. 514 U.S. 335 (1995). 
 162. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 163. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 165. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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decision, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority, the Court 
overruled Roberts, holding that the only sufficient indicia of reliability 
for testimony is confrontation.166 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion is a prime demonstration of 
Burkean Originalism. His opinion begins by asserting that the 
Constitution’s text alone cannot resolve the case, which triggers an 
investigation into the Confrontation Clause’s original meaning.167 
Parts II and III of the opinion detail the historical background of the 
clause and discern two founding principles that influenced the 
outcome of Crawford.168 First, the Sixth Amendment was principally 
directed at excluding ex parte examinations as evidence against 
defendants.169 Thus, construing the Confrontation Clause narrowly 
such that it only applies to in-court testimony ignores the framers 
concern for out-of-court ex parte examinations. Second, the framers 
would not have allowed testimony from witnesses that did not 
appear at trial unless they were unavailable and the defendant had 
already had an opportunity to cross-examine. These two founding 
principles starkly contrast with the Roberts tradition.170 
In keeping with Burke’s jurisprudence, Justice Scalia also 
assesses the reliability of the originalist evidence. Evidence of these 
two founding principles is quite robust. English common law 
traditions dating back to 1555, numerous colonial declarations of 
rights, and early U.S. constitutional debates and court decisions 
confirm this specific right to confrontation.171 Justice Scalia 
acknowledges the dissent’s criticism that the originalist evidence 
supports the idea that there should be exceptions to hearsay 
rules.172 In fact, he concedes that testimonial dying declarations may 
have been permitted contrary to the founding principles that the 
 
 166. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69. 
 167. Id. at 42–43 (stating that one could plausibly read the Amendment’s phrase “witness 
against” to mean only those who testify at trial, those statements offered at trial, or something 
in between). 
 168. Id. at 42–56. 
 169. Id. at 50. 
 170. Id. at 51 (“[E]x parte examinations might sometimes be admissible under modern 
hearsay rules, but the Framers certainly would not have condoned them.”). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 69, 73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that our rules were still 
undeveloped at the time of the founding such that the Court’s opinion is “no better rooted in 
history than our current doctrine”). 
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majority has articulated.173 Aside from this one deviation, he 
explains that the exceptions did not include testimonial statements 
against defendants and therefore did not run afoul of the framers’ 
intent. This honest and transparent evaluation of the reliability of 
the historical evidence is essential to Burkean Originalism. 
In Parts IV and V (A), Justice Scalia tackles the next Burkean 
Originalism inquiry: How and why did the Court depart from these 
founding principles? As it turns out, the bulk of Confrontation 
Clause cases treat testimonial evidence in accordance with these 
principles.174 Even Roberts’s outcome conformed, since the admitted 
testimony came from a preliminary hearing in which the defendant 
had an opportunity to examine the witness.175 Rather, the departure 
lay in the Roberts test, which extended the Dutton v. Evans “indicia of 
reliability” to testimonial hearsay evidence.176 There, the Court 
determined that the function of cross-examination could be fulfilled 
by a judicial determination that the testimony is reliable.177 
Finally, in Parts V (B) and (C), Justice Scalia applies the third 
prong of the Burkean Originalism inquiry to assess the “effects” of 
the Roberts tradition/departure. In a lengthy list of cases, he 
persuasively demonstrates how lower courts have applied the 
ambiguous Roberts test in troubling and inconsistent ways.178 
Perhaps the most troubling result of Roberts is the admission of 
accomplice confessions. In Lilly v. Virginia, the Court suggested that 
it was “highly unlikely” that these confessions against the accused 
would survive the Roberts test.179 However, one study suggested that 
appellate courts admitted these confessions more than a third of the 
time.180 Justice Scalia also demonstrated how “Roberts’ failings were 
on full display” in the instant case, drawing attention to, inter alia, 
the questionable motives of the witness, veiled threats by police 
 
 173. Id. at 56 n.6 (“If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui 
generis.”). 
 174. Id. at 57–60 (reciting a litany of cases that demonstrate this point). Importantly, the 
Court noted that “reliability factors” had been considered before Roberts, but only in connection 
with nontestimonial hearsay. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87–89 (1970) (plurality 
opinion). 
 175. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58. 
 176. Id. at 60. 
 177. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 74. 
 178. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62–65. 
 179. 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999). 
 180. Crawford, 541 U.S at 64. 
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officers, and inconsistencies in the testimony, none of which 
prevented the judge from determining that the testimony was 
reliable.181 
In light of these three considerations, the originalist evidence, 
the departure, and the effects of the resultant tradition, the Court 
disrupted the Roberts tradition in favor of a Confrontation Clause 
interpretation that aligned with founding principles. The dissent 
adopted a hard traditionalist line: the precedent is fine, and 
disrupting it would disturb the justice system. But without any 
meaningful response to Justice Scalia’s evidence that Roberts 
produced unacceptable results, the tradition does not sustain its 
presumption of validity. As Burke said, “Old establishments are tried 
by their effects,”182 and “precedents merely as such cannot make 
Law.”183 The majority opinion in Crawford is a model Burkean 
opinion, demonstrating that traditions ought to be assessed with 
reference to both their effects and their conformity to founding 
principles. 
2. Apprendi v. New Jersey: Anti-Burkean Originalism 
If Crawford is a model Burkean opinion, Apprendi is the opposite. 
In a 5–4 decision, the Court ruled unconstitutional a judicial 
tradition that gave judges the autonomy to enhance criminal 
sentences for hate crimes.184 The majority opinion, written by 
Justice Stevens, relied on weak originalist evidence and superficial 
analysis of Court precedent to reach the conclusion that “any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”185 This case underscores how a Burkean 
jurisprudence is not a blanket endorsement of originalism; rather, in 
finding space for consideration of founding principles, the majority 
critiques the wholesale reliance on those principles that originalist 
judges tend to exhibit. 
  
 
 181. Id. at 65. 
 182. BURKE, supra note 5, at 292. 
 183. CANAVAN, POLITICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 122–23 (quoting from Burke’s notes 
for a speech). 
 184. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000). 
 185. Id. at 490. 
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On the first of the three Burkean Originalism questions, the 
majority’s opinion in Apprendi, unlike Crawford, struggles to point to 
reliable original evidence of founding principles to support its 
conclusion that facts pertaining to sentencing require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt as decided by a jury. As the dissent persuasively 
demonstrates, the historical evidence is based almost entirely on two 
statements from a nineteenth-century criminal procedure treatise.186 
Even assuming those two statements truly embodied founding 
principles, they do not require the rule the majority adopted since 
the treatise does not even speak to the specific question at all.187 To 
Burke, the reliability of historical evidence is essential, as he is 
inherently skeptical of historical claims that would disrupt 
established tradition.188 
Addressing the second Burkean Originalism question, which 
asks how and why the practice departed from the original meaning of 
the text, the Court argues that its case law has not departed from 
these principles until very recently in Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States,189 and even that departure was largely corrected by its 
decision in Jones v. United States.190 In Burkean terms, the Court 
downplayed the entrenchment of any “long-standing tradition” by 
showing that any tradition that resulted from the Almendarez-Torres 
departure was too recent to be of concern. However, this sleight of 
hand ignores case law, dating back to 1977, that rejects the rule 
adopted by the majority.191 Instead, as the dissent points out, the 
 
 186. Id. at 526 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). These two statements need not be rehearsed 
here, but in essence, they state that an indictment must charge and prove the circumstances that 
warrant a higher sentence than that required by the common law. Id. at 480–81 (majority 
opinion) (quoting J. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 51 (15th ed. 1862)). 
The majority pointed to another category of evidence; common law judges had no discretion in 
sentencing. Id. at 477–81. However, the Court itself dismisses its relevance based on the Court-
approved tradition of allowing some judicial discretion. Id. at 481–82. 
 187. Id. at 527 (O’Connor J., dissenting) (noting that the specific question involves “when 
a fact that bears on a defendant’s punishment, but which the legislature has not classified as an 
element of the charged offense, must nevertheless be treated as an offense element”). Justice 
O’Connor goes on to refute the credibility of the original evidence raised by Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence, which advocates an even broader ruling. Id. at 527–29. 
 188. Mansfield, supra note 28, at 703. 
 189. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
 190. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 191. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v. 
New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 259 (2001) (stating that in the twenty-
five years between Mullaney and Apprendi, the Court never ruled against sentencing factors on 
constitutional grounds). 
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majority’s rule “casts aside our traditional cautious approach” to 
such questions, despite “marshal[ing] virtually no authority to 
support its extraordinary rule.”192 Thus, assuming the majority’s 
founding principles to be correct, the departure occurred in 1977,193 
ushering in “three decades worth of nationwide reform.”194 State 
legislatures and judiciaries ordered itself around this departure.195 
The new practice quickly became a well-entrenched tradition. Under 
this theory of Burkean Originalism, the existence of established 
tradition triggers a presumption in its favor. 
Finally, the majority fails to appreciate the effects of disrupting 
the nearly quarter-century long tradition, which is the third Burkean 
Originalism question. This oversight is the natural result of failing to 
acknowledge the existence of a tradition in the first place. Instead, as 
the dissent forecasts, the broad rule adopted by the Court will result 
in tremendous disruption of current judicial and legislative practice 
and impending uncertainty in sentencing conducted in the 
immediate future.196 “[The Court’s] decision will have the effect of 
invalidating significant sentencing reform accomplished at the 
federal and state levels over the past three decades.”197 In fact, just 
one year following this decision, forty-eight federal statutes were at 
risk, considered by some scholars to be just the “tip of the 
iceberg.”198 
The majority’s answers to each of the three Burkean questions 
fail to justify the conclusion it reached. To the contrary, Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent persuasively discredits the majority’s founding 
principles, substantiates the existence of a long-standing tradition, 
and displays the negative consequences of disrupting that tradition. 
Burkean Originalism, therefore, does not distribute wins and losses 
 
 192. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 525 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, it is remarkable that 
the Court cannot identify a single instance, in the over 200 years since the ratification of the Bill of 
Rights, that our Court has applied, as a constitutional requirement, the rule it announces 
today.”). To further prove this point, the dissent stated the following: “That the Court begins its 
review of our precedent with a quotation from a dissenting opinion speaks volumes about the 
support that actually can be drawn from our cases for the ‘increase in the maximum penalty’ rule 
announced today.” Id. at 529 (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 251). 
 193. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
 194. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 549–52. 
 197. Id. at 549. 
 198. Hoffmann, supra note 191, at 255. 
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in the same way traditional originalism does. Outcomes often align 
with a precedent-based approach, as Professors Strauss and Young 
suggest a Burkean jurisprudence should. 
3. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: A Burkean result argued in a 
not-so-Burkean way 
Some decisions, viewed through a Burkean lens, reach the right 
result but do not focus on the considerations outlined in this 
Comment. Consequently, the emphases of the opinion are different. 
This is true of McIntyre, noted in Part II for the debate over 
originalism and tradition that played in the concurrence and dissent 
by Justices Thomas and Scalia, respectively.199 The Court invalidated 
an Ohio election regulation prohibiting the distribution of 
anonymous campaign literature, applying strict scrutiny analysis as it 
would any other law abridging free speech.200 However, in treating it 
as any other law,201 the majority ignores two key contextual facts. 
First, this regulation is a part of a species of election protection that 
exists in every state except California and dates back to the late 
nineteenth century.202 Second, unlike much free speech regulation, 
this regulation’s validity is vulnerable to originalist arguments.203 
Consequently, the majority opinion contains limited discussion of 
the key Burkean considerations—namely, the reliability of the 
originalist evidence and the strength of the established tradition. 
In truth, a Burkean opinion would actually combine the 
considerations of each of the three main opinions. First, Justice 
Thomas and Justice Scalia (although at odds) engage in a lengthy 
discussion of the reliability of the original evidence of founding 
attitudes toward anonymous speech. On one hand, Justice Thomas 
marshals considerable evidence that the framers employed 
anonymous speech.204 On the other, Justice Scalia argues that “to 
prove that anonymous electioneering was used frequently is not to 
establish that it is a constitutional right.”205 Still, unable to 
 
 199. See supra Part II. 
 200. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995). 
 201. See id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority treats this law as if it 
were like the Los Angeles municipal ordinance at issue in Talley v. California). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See generally id. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 204. Id. at 360. 
 205. Id. at 373 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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demonstrate any framer-animus toward anonymous electioneering, 
Justice Scalia could only emphasize the ambiguity of the speech 
clause. Clearly, the Framers’ use of anonymous speech highlights its 
value as a founding principle, whether or not it is considered a 
right.206 Second, Justice Scalia’s dissent sings a somewhat Burkean 
tune with its presumption in favor of longstanding traditions when 
the constitutional text is ambiguous.207 Certainly, Burke would 
pause before disrupting a century-long tradition. But ultimately, as 
both the majority and Justice Thomas’s concurrence suggest, the 
effects of disrupting this century-long tradition are not only 
insubstantial, they are actually positive. Allowing anonymous 
electioneering speech contributes information that could be essential 
to voting decisions, especially since it may be the type of speech that 
may not be expressed if anonymity was forbidden.208 
As I have demonstrated through these three cases, Burkean 
Originalism is an approach to judicial decision making that evaluates 
the weight of originalist evidence, the severity of the departure, and 
the strength of the established precedent. I make no claim that a 
systematic consideration of these factors will always yield predictable 
outcomes, for to do so would be to reject the essence of a true 
Burkean inquiry. Rather, I have shown that originalism plays a 
meaningful role in a Burkean approach to these difficult cases, and 
conservatives should not reject originalism on the basis of Edmund 
Burke’s thought. 
C. Burkean Originalism: A Useful Framework for the Originialist 
Conservatives Deciding N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning 
In Part II, I explained that the Supreme Court will soon decide 
the constitutionality of President Barack Obama’s recess 
appointments to the National Labor Relations Board, a case known 
as N.L.R.B. v. Canning.209 This case puts the primary dilemma of this 
Comment on full display. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion hammers the 
 
 206. Even Justice Scalia concedes this point: “Absent [the long-standing tradition at issue], 
I would be inclined to agree with the concurrence that a society which used anonymous political 
debate so regularly would not regard as constitutional even moderate restrictions made to 
improve the election process.” Id. at 375. 
 207. I note that the last part of the corresponding sentence is much less Burkean than the 
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 208. Id. 
 209. See supra Part II. 
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robust originalist evidence that such appointments are restricted to 
“the Recess,” which could only have meant intersession, not 
intrasession, appointments.210 On the other hand, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision, as well as the government’s briefs, have 
highlighted the very well-established tradition of intrasession 
appointments, dating back 146 years to 1867.211 This case provides 
occasion to consider how justices like Scalia or Thomas may 
approach this question in a way that does not betray either their 
originalist or their conservative inclinations. This section analyzes 
the primary issue in Canning, whether the President can use the 
recess appointment power for intrasession appointments, by 
considering the three questions outlined at the beginning of Part IV. 
I conclude that the result reached by the D.C. Circuit is proper under 
Burkean Originalism. 
1. What founding principles can we reliably discern? 
In other words, what does the evidence of original meaning tell 
us about the constitutional text? Unfortunately for the government’s 
position, the evidence of the original meaning of the recess 
appointment clause is fairly convincing that intrasession 
appointments were not contemplated by the drafters. The D.C. 
Circuit’s Canning opinion cites a number of founding-era sources, 
including the 1755 edition of Samuel Johnson’s English dictionary, 
the Federalist Papers, the actions taken by the First Congress, and 
the actions of presidents in the first decades following the 
Constitution’s ratification.212 Each of these sources demonstrate 
that the term “the Recess” could only have been understood to 
authorize intersession appointments.213 Further, the very first 
Attorney General opinion to address the question of intrasession 
appointments found them to be unconstitutional.214 In 1901, 
Attorney General Knox decided that the term “recess” permitted 
only intersession appointments. After marshaling the historical and 
structural evidence, Knox states that this “conclusion is irresistible 
 
 210. N.L.R.B. v. Canning, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 211. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 212. Canning, 705 F.3d at 500–501. 
 213. Id. 
 214. 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 599 (1901); see also Michael Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the 
Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1573 (2005). 
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to me.”215 The Eleventh Circuit’s Evans opinion did not engage the 
historical evidence as thoroughly. Instead, the court argued that the 
intrasession conception of the clause is at least permissible (which is 
much different than saying it is correct),216 and given a presumption 
that the President’s interpretations of the Constitution are 
constitutional, this permissibility is enough to authorize the 
appointments. As Professor Rappaport concludes in his extensive 
article on the original meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
“The intersession interpretation employs an historically grounded 
reading of the constitutional text and conforms to constitutional 
structure and purpose.”217 Further, regarding the intrasession 
definition, he demonstrates that the “biggest problem” for the 
intrasession definition currently advanced by the Obama 
administration is that “it cannot derive its definition of ‘recess’ from 
the constitutional text.”218 In sum, concerning the first Burkean 
Originalism question, there is strong evidence that the original 
meaning of the text does not support the President’s use of the 
recess appointment power for intrasession appointments. 
2. How and why did we depart from this principle? 
Twenty years after Attorney General Knox’s opinion, Attorney 
General Daugherty reversed and adopted a more practical 
interpretation of the clause.219 Daugherty points out that there 
would be “disastrous consequences” if the more strict interpretation 
prevailed.220 In full, he explained what was at stake if a practical 
interpretation were not adopted:  
If the President’s power of appointment is to be defeated because 
the Senate takes an adjournment to a specified date, the painful and 
inevitable result will be measurably to prevent the exercise of 
governmental functions. I can not bring myself to believe that the 
 
 215. 23 Op. Att’y Gen. at 604. 
 216. Evans, 387 F.3d at 1224 (“In this case, the Senate’s break fits the definition of 
“recess” in use when the Constitution was ratified: the dictionary definitions that have been 
called to our attention did not, for example, speak of a minimum time. . . . ‘[T]he Recess,’ 
originally and through today, could just as properly refer generally to any one . . . of the 
Senate’s acts of recessing.”). 
 217. Rappaport, supra note 214, at 1573. 
 218. Id. 
 219. 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20 (1921); see also Rappaport, supra note 214, at 1573. 
 220. 33 Op. Att’y Gen. at 23. 
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framers of the Constitution ever intended such a catastrophe to 
happen. 
In just twenty years, the priority of the executive branch had 
changed from strict adherence to the letter of the Recess 
Appointments Clause to fulfillment of its spirit. The government 
departed from the founding principles in order to meet the needs of 
an executive that was much larger in 1920 than in 1789. Thus, in the 
ensuing years, “[t]welve Presidents have made more than 285 
intrasession recess appointments of persons to offices that ordinarily 
require the consent of the Senate.”221  
3. What are the practical consequences of disrupting the tradition that has 
grown from the departure? 
As the D.C. Circuit’s Canning opinion suggests, reverting to the 
more historical interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause 
may have disruptive effects. Just within the context of this case, 
three out of the five appointees to the National Labor Relations 
Board would no longer validly occupy their positions. This would call 
into question nearly ever decision made by the NLRB post-dating 
these individuals’ January 4, 2012 appointment, especially 
considering 29 U.S.C. 160(f) places no time limit on petitions for 
review of the board’s decisions.222 Beyond just these appointments, 
such a reversion could possible unsettle other decisions and actions 
taken by intrasession recess appointees in times past.223 
In addition, such a decision may have dramatic effects on the 
ability of future presidents to make appointments necessary to keep 
the government functioning. The Daugherty opinion warned of 
catastrophe.224 And while it is arguable whether the lack of a valid 
quorum at the N.L.R.B. would impede the government’s function—
and a notion with which the Senators who repeatedly blocked 
President Obama’s nomination would disagree—it is not difficult to 
imagine a number of positions that, if left vacant because of political 
stalemate, might paralyze the government significantly. 
  
 
 221. Evans, 387 F.3d at 1226. 
 222. See N.L.R.B. v. Canning, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3629 (No. 12–1281). 
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On the other hand, the elimination of this intrasession recess 
appointment power would force executives to nominate more 
politically viable individuals.225 When faced with a choice between a 
handicapped government and a less-than-ideal nominee, presidents 
may decide the latter for fear of the political consequences that 
would follow the former. Additionally, it is unlikely that the past 
decisions of improperly appointed officers would be reversed 
considering the court’s unwillingness to allow past decisions to be 
collaterally attacked.226 
Having answered these three questions, it is helpful to consider 
the Burkean Originalism canon I have posited for this Comment: 
long-standing traditions should be preserved unless evidence of a 
countervailing founding principle is reliable and the consequences of 
disrupting the tradition are not substantial. The question presented 
in Canning involves whether to overturn the long-standing tradition 
of intrasession recess appointment. Burkean Originalism starts by 
presuming such tradition as valid. But as the answer to the first 
question suggests, the evidence of a countervailing founding 
principle, that intrasession appointments were neither contemplated 
by the founders nor consistent with the structure of the 
Constitution, is quite reliable. The question ultimately turns on how 
the originalist conservative jurist views the potentially disruptive 
effects of reverting to the intersession construction of the clause. In 
my view, the effects will not be nearly as disruptive as the United 
States government has asserted in its briefings. In fact, the reversion 
will force more productive political engagement by forcing executives 
to nominate more politically viable individuals to fill those positions 
that require the advice and consent of the Senate. In this way, the 
originalist, conservative jurist can validate both aspects of his or her 
jurisprudence. Originalism and conservatism are indeed compatible, 
but only if judges are willing to ask the right questions as they 
formulate their opinions. 
 
 225. See generally Canning, 705 F.3d at 500–504; Amelia Frenkel, Defining Recess 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In the extreme case, in which incontrovertible evidence of 
original intent contradicts a firmly established, longstanding 
tradition, judges who simultaneously espouse conservative and 
originalist jurisprudences find themselves in a bind. On the one 
hand, invalidating a well-entrenched tradition flies in the face of 
conservative respect for gradual development and cautious change. 
Yet, on the other hand, ignoring counter-evidence of original intent 
is incompatible with an originalist respect for founding wisdom. 
Scholars such as Professors David Strauss, Thomas Merrill, and 
Ernest Young have used this disruption dilemma as a means to 
persuade against an originalist jurisprudence. 
While Burke is considered the father of conservatism, he must 
not be read as a dogmatic adherent to precedent. Old institutions or 
precedents deserve a starting presumption of legitimacy, but they are 
not necessarily legitimate by mere duration of time.227 Instead, 
tradition is constrained by natural rights, and institutions are 
legitimate insofar as they conform to the limits and ends that natural 
rights dictate. Thus, we see that, to Burke, precedent was beholden 
to something greater than itself, to higher, even original, 
principles.228 
Burke’s writings reveal an inner conflict, which is at times 
contradictory, between embracing gradual progression and 
respecting ancient wisdom. His writings are replete with explicit 
references to “canonized forefathers,” “founding principles,” 
“ancestors,” and “antiquity.” At the same time, his philosophy 
demands accepting that established institutions are yet imperfect, 
that “a state without the means of some change is without the 
means of its conservation,” and that “without such means it might 
even risk the loss of that part of the constitution which it wished the 
most religiously to preserve.”229 Despite the arguments of 
Professors Strauss, Merrill, and Young, the inner conflict between 
conservative and originalist values is inherently Burkean.230 
I noted, at the outset, that Burke’s writings pose significant 
interpretive difficulties. Because he never wrote a treatise that 
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coherently explains his philosophy, students of Burke are left to 
make sense of his twelve volumes of writings and speeches, which 
contain many inconsistencies and reveal a significant evolution in his 
thought over time. It seems that many invocations of Burke are 
weakened by the interpretive difficulty in Burke’s writings, and they 
often imagine an Edmund Burke that is, in fact, far removed from 
reality. Where such invocations see him as immovably committed to 
precedent and tradition, the Burke that delivered impassioned 
speeches before the British House of Commons and penned 
extensive critiques of the French Revolution held a much more 
nuanced position. Here, I delved into the writings of Burke to 
unearth this nuance, and as I have shown, the real Burke looks more 
like the disparaged originalist conservatives than a one-dimensional 
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